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Abstract The possessive marker own exhibits a complicated behavior that gives 
rise to a wide range of subtle meaning differences. Accordingly, the theoretical 
literature has proposed a number of different characterizations of this element. 
This paper uses (primarily) data from association with focus to disentangle the 
various effects that own gives rise to and argue that there are at least two distinct 
homophonous items: ownR, a reflexivizer that operates on a syntactically derived 
predicate, and ownPoss, a marker of strong/inalienable possession. We provide a 
compositional analysis of examples with ownR that derives its distribution without 
the need to invoke any item-specific principle of Binding Theory; obligatory 
reflexivization follows from the lexical semantics of ownR, and locality 
restrictions follow from independent restrictions on the formation of derived 
predicates in the syntax. We thus provide evidence for (i) the dissociation of 
reflexivization and locality, and (ii) the formation of complex predicates in the 
syntax. 
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1 Introduction 
Work on Binding Theory in different frameworks (e.g, Reinhart and Reuland 
1993; Pollard and Sag 1994) converged on the idea that Binding Theory regulates 
relations between co-arguments of a predicate rather than the distribution of DPs. 
Specifically for reflexive anaphors, it was argued that they are only licensed if a 
reflexivization operation identifies two co-arguments. In response, cases of non-
local reflexives with wider locality domains have been identified, and it has been 
argued that the size of the domain is a parameter of variation in Binding Theory 
(see, e.g., review in Büring 2005: §3); different anaphoric elements (across and 
within languages) can have different locality requirements and these requirements 
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are written separately on the principle of Binding Theory that governs their 
distribution. This conclusion, however, presupposes that reflexivization is 
intrinsically linked to lexical predicates. The current paper argues that this is not 
necessarily the case and that the option exists that a reflexivization operation 
applies to a non-local, syntactically derived predicate, i.e. that reflexivization and 
locality are dissociated. In the presence of reflexivizers, co-argumenthood is 
always the relevant locality domain, irrespective of whether the relevant predicate 
is local or non-local.  
Our empirical argument is based on a detailed examination of the possessive 
marker own. own appears with both pronominal and referential possessors in a 
range of syntactic environments and gives rise to a wide range of subtle meaning 
differences. A sample is given in (1).
1
  
(1) a. Zelda painted her own room. 
b. I was betrayed by my own mother.   
c. Finally I get my own room back, no more sharing with Little Whiskey! 
d. John will never have his own key.     
e. John makes his own clothes.      
f. Your mother doesn’t work here. Clean your OWN mess. 
g. Mary’s own book is more important than John’s. 
We focus on cases in which own modifies a possessive pronoun. It is such cases 
that have been studied in the literature on Binding Theory, since examples like 
(1a) seem to involve obligatory variable binding, similar to cases of reflexive 
anaphors like English herself. Authors who attempt to classify her own as a 
reflexive anaphor are forced to adopt a non-unified account of the possessive 
marker (Fiengo and Higginbotham 1981; Safir 1996, among others). Other 
authors have pursued a unified account of own. For instance, Zribi-Hertz (1995) 
enriches the typology of expressions by adding Unspecified Bindable 
Expressions, like her own, which are subject to the weak principle in (2).  
(2) An Unspecified Bindable Expression may be bound. 
Baker (1995) classifies her own as an intensive pronoun which is subject to 
discourse constraints that are independent of Binding Theory. In his 
implementation, own is an add-on on the possessive pronoun, which, as far as 
Binding Theory is concerned, behaves like any other pronominal anaphor.        
 This paper uses (primarily) data from association with focus to disentangle the 
various effects that own gives rise to and argue for an ambiguity account. We 
propose that there exist at least two distinct homophonous items: ownR, an arity 
reducer that operates on a syntactically derived predicate, and ownPoss, a marker of 
                                                 
1
 The examples in (1d) and (1e) are taken from Safir (1996). 
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strong/inalienable possession. Like English reflexive anaphors, ownR, leads to 
obligatory reflexivization and obeys locality restrictions. We provide a 
compositional analysis of examples with ownR that derives its distribution without 
the need to invoke any item-specific principle of Binding Theory; obligatory 
reflexivization follows from the lexical semantics of ownR, and locality 
restrictions follow from independent restrictions on the formation of derived 
predicates in the syntax. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our basic assumptions 
about the syntax and semantics of possession and the position of own in the 
structure. Section 3 argues for the existence of ownR, a reflexivizer that operates 
on a derived predicate. Section 4 argues for the existence of ownPoss, a marker of 
strong possession. Section 5 shows that ownR cannot be reduced to ownPoss. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2 Preliminaries to the syntax and semantics of possession 
This section provides our basic assumptions about the syntax and semantics of 
possessive phrases and discusses the position of own within them. We assume 
with Abney (1987) that prenominal possessives like (3a) are DPs headed by a 
possessive determiner ’s, as in (3b), and that possessive pronouns, as in (4a), are 
possessive determiners, as in (4b).2 
(3) a. Zelda’s room 
b. [DP Zelda [D’ [D  ’s] [NP room]]] 
(4) a. Her room 
b. [DP [D’ [D  her] [NP room]]] 
On the semantic side, we follow Barker (1995) in assuming that the possessive 
determiner introduces a possessive relation R which holds between the possessor 
and the possessee and whose value is determined pragmatically, as in (5). In the 
case of relational nouns, as in (6a), the relation is determined lexically by the 
content of the relational noun. In this case, the entry for the determiner is the one 
in (6b).  
(5) [[ ’s]] = λPetλyιx. P(x) & R(x)(y) 
(6) a. Zelda’s brother 
b. [[ ’s]] = λRe,etλyιx. R(x)(y) 
                                                 
2
 We focus on prenominal possessives, since own is out with post-nominal ones. 
(i) *the (own) room of (own) Zelda 
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As Safir (1996) argues convincingly, own modifies the possessive determiner 
rather than the noun, as in (7) and (8). For one thing, own never occurs in the 
absence of a possessive determiner, as in (9) (Safir 1996: ex. 34a). Moreover, 
constituency tests like coordination reveal that whereas the possessive pronoun 
and own form a constituent, as in shown in (10a) (Safir 1996: ex. 35a), own and 
the noun do not, as shown in (10b) (Safir 1996: ex. 35b). The latter is confirmed 
by the ellipsis test in (11) (Nishiguchi 2009: ex. 25b).  
(7) a. Zelda’s own room 
b. [DP Zelda [D’ [D  ’s own] [NP room]]] 
(8) a. Her own room 
b. [DP [D’ [D  her own] [NP room]]] 
(9) *The own problems are the worst.  
(10) a.    Every camper must deal with his own or her own problems. 
b.??John will have his his own key and own towel. 
(11) *Jim used his own pen and Mary used her. 
3 own and reflexivization 
This section argues for the existence of ownR, a reflexivizer that operates on a 
derived predicate identifying two of its arguments. Section 3.1 provides an 
analysis of local reflexives as arity reducers and presents an empirical argument 
based on focus alternatives in favor of the analysis. Section 3.2 applies this 
diagnostic to examples with own and argues that own can also be an arity reducer. 
Section 3.3 provides a compositional analysis of the relevant examples. Section 
3.4 presents additional evidence in favor the analysis by considering restrictions 
on the distribution of ownR.  
3.1 Reflexive anaphors as arity reducers   
Reflexive anaphors like English herself in (12) have been given two competing 
semantic analyses.  
(12) Zelda praised herself. 
In one line of inquiry, they have been treated as designated bound variables 
subject to a syntactic co-occurrence restriction (‘Principle A’ in (14)) that forces 
the presence of a co-indexed binder index (see Heim and Kratzer 1998; Büring 
2005; among others), as in (13). Notice that in some implementations of this 
analysis (e.g., Heim and Kratzer 1998) the binder prefix is dependent on 
movement of the antecedent of the anaphor, here the external argument. The 
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syntactic rule of Index Re-analysis forces the index of a moved DP to be 
separated by its host and be reattached right below it. The newly formed 
constituent immediately dominating the binder index is interpreted via the rule of 
Predicate Abstraction in (15). In a different line, mainly within Categorial 
Grammar, the binding requirement is built into the lexical semantics of the 
anaphor, so that it is treated as an arity reducing operator (see Bach and Partee 
1980; Szabolcsi 1992; among others), as in (16). In this case the anaphor 
composes with the verb and turns a two-place relation into a reflexive predicate.    
(13) Zelda 1 accused herself1. 
(14) a. Principle A  
    Reflexive anaphors must be bound in their minimal governing category. 
b. Binding 
    α semantically binds β iff (i) α is binder prefix, (ii) α and β are co- 
    indexed, and (iii) α c-commands β.   
(15) Predicate Abstraction 
If α is a branching node whose daughters are a binding operator β1 and γ, 
then [[ α]] 
g
 = λx. [[ γ]] 
g [ 1  →  x ]  
. 
(16) [[ herself ]] = λRe,estλxλe. R(x)(x)(e)  
Of particular interest here is Lechner 2012, which argues for a hybrid account, 
i.e. one that adopts the arity reducing semantics in (16), but assumes that the 
operator applies at a predicate derived syntactically after movement of an 
argument (see Nissenabum 2000).
3
 As noted already in Lechner 2012, this option 
is forced in a framework that “severs the external argument from the verb” 
(Kratzer 1996) so that transitive verbs like praise actually denote unary relations, 
as in (17a).4 In this case, the arity reducing semantics force the anaphor to move 
to a position where it can combine with a two-place relation. Adopting Kratzer’s 
(1996) Voice head introducing the external argument, as in (17c), the first 
relevant position is a projection of Voice before the external argument is merged.
5
   
A partial derivation for (12) is provided in (17). The anaphor cannot be 
interpreted in the direct object position due to type incompatibility. It moves and 
adjoins to VoiceP1. After Index Re-analysis and Predicate Abstraction, VoiceP2 
                                                 
3
 Lechner’s (2012) empirical argument in favor of the arity reducing analysis is based on the 
distribution of herself in structures containing ditransitives. We do not have the space to go into 
such structures in this paper. We refer to Lechner 2012 for details. 
4
 Notice that Lechner’s (2012) discussion is independent of this issue and he does not provide a 
derivation based on Voice.  
5
 Lechner (2012) names movement of herself Anaphor Raising, and provides a detailed 
comparison with other type-driven movements, like Quantifier Raising. 
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denotes a two-place predicate. The anaphor reflexivizes this derived predicate. 
The subject DP, then, saturates the open argument slot that is still open.  
(17) [VoiceP4 Zelda [VoiceP3 herself [VoiceP2 1 [VoiceP1 Voice [VP [V praised] t1]]]]  
a. [[ V]]    = λxλe. praise(x)(e)  
b. [[ VP]]   = λe. praise(1)(e)  
c. [[ Voice]]  = λfs,tλxλe. f(e) & agent(x)(e) 
d. [[ VoiceP1]]  = λxλe. praise(1)(e) & agent(x)(e) 
e. [[ VoiceP2]]  = λyλxλe. praise(y)(e) & agent(x)(e) 
f. [[ VoiceP3]]  = λxλe. praise(x)(e) & agent(x)(e)  
e. [[ VoiceP4]]  = λe. praise(Zelda)(e) & agent(Zelda)(e)  
Spathas (2010, 2012) provides an empirical argument in favor of the arity 
reducing analysis. It is observed there that narrow focus on a reflexive anaphor is 
licensed in two rather different environments (see also Ahn 2012). For example, 
in the Question-Answer (QA) pairs below, the same sentence with the same 
intonational contour is used to answer both an object wh-question as in (18), as 
well as a subject wh-question as in (19).
6
  
(18) Q: Who did Zelda praise? 
A: She praised herSELF. 
(19) Q: Who praised Zelda? 
A: She praised herSELF. 
Spathas (2010, 2012) argues that the licensing of focus in (19) forces a treatment 
of reflexive anaphors in terms of reflexivizing functions, rather than designated 
bound variables. The regular meaning of (18/19A) is, of course, the same in both 
cases (roughly, the proposition that Zelda praised Zelda), but under focus-
sensitive rules of QA-Congruence the Focus Meanings should be rather different. 
Assume for concreteness the theory of Schwarzschild (1999) so that Focus 
Meanings are Existential F-Closures, as in (20). The distribution of focus in QA-
pairs is determined by the Focus Principle in (21) (based on Beaver and Clark 
2008: 37). This requires that the Existential Closure of the Question, defined 
informally in (22), entails the Existential F-Closure of the Answer. 
(20) Existential F-Closure (informal)   
a. Build the ‘presuppositional skeleton’ by replacing F-marked constituents  
    with variables of the same type. 
b. Existentially bind the variables.      
                                                 
6
 I assume that the syntactic correlate of focus is F-marking (see Jackendoff 1972) and syntactic 
nodes can be freely annotated with a privative feature F(ocus). In the phonological component, F-
marking is linked to prosodic prominence relative to a domain of focus (see Truckenbrodt 1995). 
Prominence is indicated here with small capitals.  
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(21) Focus Principle  
The Existential Closure of the Question entails the Existential F-Closure of 
(a part of) the Answer. 
(22) Existential Closure for Questions (informal)    
a. Build the ‘presuppositional skeleton’ by replacing wh-constituents with   
    variables of the same type. 
b. Existentially bind the variables.  
Since in (18) and (19) narrow focus falls on the anaphor, the Existential F-Closure 
depends crucially on its semantics.
7
 Assuming that reflexives are designated 
bound variables, i.e. elements of type e, the Existential F-Closure of (18A) and 
(19A) is as in (23). This licenses the QA-pair in (18) since QA-Congruence is 
satisfied, as shown in (24). However, we get the wrong result in the case of (19), 
since QA-Congruence is not satisfied, as shown in (25).  
(23)  ExF-Clo(Zelda 1 praised [herself1]F = ∃x∃e. Zelda praised x in e 
(24) a. ExClo(Who did Zelda praise?) = ∃x∃e. Zelda praised x in e 
b. ∃x∃e. Zelda praised x in e entails ∃x∃e. Zelda praised x in e 
(25) a. ExClo(Who praised Zelda?) = ∃x∃e. x praised Zelda in e 
b. ∃x∃e. x praised Zelda in e does not entail ∃x∃e. Zelda praised x in e 
Assuming, on the other hand, that reflexive anaphors are arity reducers, we get the 
correct result. In this case, the Existential F-Closure is as in (26). The idea is that 
a focused anaphor does not contrast with individuals, but with other arity reducing 
operations of the same type, like Passivization and Anti-passivization in (27). 
Given (16), QA-Congruence is satisfied for both (18), as shown in (28), and (19), 
as shown in (29).     
(26)  ExF-Clo(Zelda praised [herself]F = ∃Qeet,et∃e. (Q(praised in e))(Zelda) 
(27) a. [[ Passivization]] = λRλxλe∃y. R(x)(y)(e) 
b. [[ Anti-Passivization]] = λRλxλe∃y. R(y)(x)(e)     
(28) ∃x∃e. Zelda praised x in e entails ∃Qeet,et∃e. (Q(praised in e))(Zelda)  
for Q=AntiPass 
                                                 
7
 Notice that prosodic prominence of a reflexive anaphor in argument position unambiguously 
indicates narrow focus on the anaphor; in the case of wider focus domains, such as VP focus in 
(ii), the reflexive anaphor necessarily prosodically subordinates to the verb. See Spathas 2010 and 
Ahn 2012 for alternative explanations of this pattern. 
(ii) Q: What did Zelda do?     
A: Zelda [PRAISED herself]F.         
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(29) ∃x∃e. x praised Zelda in e entails ∃Qeet,et∃e. (Q(praised in e))(Zelda) 
for Q=Pass 
It is the licensing of focus in examples like (19), then, that can be used as a 
diagnostic for the arity reducing semantics. In previous work, I called Focus 
Meanings like (26) Subject Alternatives (SA) and showed that they arise not only 
in the case of QA-pairs, but also in the case of free-focus, contrast, and (with 
some restrictions) association with focus-sensitive operators (Spathas 2010, 
2012). For example, consider the case of negation in (30).  
(30) a. Zelda did not praise herSELF. She praised OSCAR. 
b. Zelda did not praise herSELF. OSCAR praised her.  
Association with a focused reflexive anaphor gives rise either to the inference that 
Zelda praised someone other than herself, illustrated in (30a), or to the inference 
that someone other than herself praised Zelda, illustrated in (30b). We assume a 
model of discourse according to which all utterances are answers to an explicit or 
implicit Current Question (i.e. the question whose answer is the immediate goal 
among interlocutors in a conversation) (Roberts 2012; Beaver and Clark 2008). If 
so, focus in (30) is also subject to the Focus Principle. Since the Current Question 
is not explicit, it has to be accommodated. Accommodation is driven by the Focus 
Principle. According to the Focus Principle, a part of Zelda didn’t praise herSELF 
should entail the Existential Closure of the accommodated Current Question. This 
could be the form without negation, i.e. Zelda praised herSELF. Its focus 
structure allows accommodation of two CQs, as described above for (18) and 
(19). In (30a), the presence of She praised Oscar forces accommodation of Who 
did Zelda praise?. In (30b), the presence of Oscar praised her forces 
accommodation of Who praised Zelda?. The choice of CQ, then, determines the 
inference. In the next section we use this diagnostic to determine the status of 
own. 
3.2 own as an arity reducer   
In this section we apply the diagnostic based on Subject Alternatives to examples 
with own. Like in the case of the reflexive anaphor herself, narrow focus on own 
is licensed in two different environments. In the QA-pairs below, the same 
sentence with the same intonational contour can be used to answer both a 
possessor wh-question, as in (31), as well as a subject wh-question, as in (32).     
(31) Q: Whose room did Zelda paint?  
A: She painted her OWN room. 
(32) Q: Who painted Zelda’s room?   
A: She painted her OWN room.  
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If her own was interpreted as a designated bound variable, the QA-pair in (32) 
would never be licensed. The Existential F-Closure of (32A) in this case would be 
as in (33a). If so, the Focus Principle is violated since the Existential Closure of 
(32Q) does not entail the Existential F-Closure of (32A).    
(33) a. ExF-Clo(Zelda 1 painted [her own1]F room) = ∃x∃e. Zelda painted x’s  
    room in e 
b. ∃x∃e. x painted Zelda’s room in e does not entail  
    ∃x∃e. Zelda painted x’s  room in e 
Assuming, on the other hand, that own is an arity reducer, as in (34a), with the 
Existential F-Closure in (34b), the Focus Principle is licensed for both (31) and 
(32), as shown in (35) and (36), respectively. 
(34) a. [[ ownR ]]  = λRe,estλxλe. R(x)(x)(e) 
b. ∃Qeest,est. [Q(λyλxλe. painted-y’s room(e) & agent(x)(e))](Zelda) 
(35) ∃x∃e. Zelda painted x’s room in e entails  
∃Qeest,est ∃e. [Q(λyλx. painted-y’s room(e) & agent(x)(e))](Zelda)  
for Q= AntiPass 
(36) ∃x∃e. x painted Zelda’s room in e entails  
∃Qeest,est ∃e. [Q(λyλx. painted-y’s room(e) & agent(x)(e))](Zelda)  
for Q=Pass 
As in the case of herself, this is not an isolated fact about QA-pairs. Subject 
Alternatives arise in a number of other focus-sensitive environments, both in the 
case of so-called free focus, such as the correction in (37), and in the case of  
association with focus, such as negation in (38), the quantificational adverb in 
(39), and genericity in (40). We conclude that own can instantiate an arity reducer. 
To distinguish own as an arity reducer from other instances of own, we use the 
subscript R, which stands for ‘reflexivizer’.     
(37) A: Oscar painted Zelda’s room.      
B: No, she painted her OWN room. 
(38) Zelda did not paint her OWN room. OSCAR painted her room. 
(39) Zelda always paints her OWN room. She never lets other people paint her  
room. 
(40) Hard-working people paint their OWN room. They never let other people 
paint their room. 
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3.3 Reflexivizing non-local predicates   
This section provides the derivation of examples with ownR and dicusses the fact 
that the possessive pronoun is predicted to be interpreted as a bound variable. The 
derivation proceeds as follows. As discussed in section 2, we assume that ownR is 
the sister of a possessive D. In this position, however, it is uninterpretable. We 
assume that ownR moves to the first available position where it can be interpreted. 
This is VoiceP1. After Index Re-analysis and Predicate Abstraction, VoiceP2 
denotes a two-place predicate. ownR reflexivizes this derived predicate. The 
subject DP, then, saturates the argument slot that is still open. Notice that, unlike 
in the case of herself in (17), the trace of ownR cannot be interpreted. We will 
tentatively assume that the trace of ownR is semantically vacuous.  
(41) [VoiceP4 Zelda [VoiceP3 ownR [VoiceP2 1 [VoiceP1 Voice [VP painted [DP [D’ [D her1 
t1] room]]]]]]] 
a. [[ VP]]   = λe. painted-1’s room(e) 
b. [[ VoiceP1]]  = λxλe. painted-1’s room(e) & agent(x)(e) 
c. [[ VoiceP2]]  = λyλxλe. painted-y’s room(e) & agent(x)(e) 
d. [[ VoiceP3]]  = λxλe. painted-x’s room(e) & agent(x)(e)  
e. [[ VoiceP4]]  = λe. painted-Zelda’s room(e) & agent(Zelda)(e) 
We have also crucially assumed in (41) that the possessive pronoun her is co-
indexed with ownR. This is why Predicate Abstraction leads to abstraction over 
the possessor. If her and and ownR were contra-indexed, the derivation would fail, 
as VoiceP1 would not have a meaning of the right type. We assume that indexing 
is free, so that only derivations in which ownR and her are co-indexed are 
interpretable.
8
 The account predicts, then, that the presence of ownR is contingent 
on the presence of a possessive pronoun and that the pronoun will always be 
interpreted as a bound variable. Indeed, examples with ownR seem to allow sloppy 
but not strict identity in cases like (42) (Nishiguchi 2009: ex. 44d) and (43). 
(42)   Mary called her own mother and so did Sally.   
  ‘Mary called Mary’s mother and Sally called Sally’s mother.’ 
#‘Mary called Mary’s mother and Sally called Mary’s mother.’ 
                                                 
8
 The same type of analysis could be given for herself if one wishes to decompose the anaphor into 
a pronominal part and the arity reducer self. Some evidence that a decomposition of this type is on 
the right track comes from the fact that the pronominal part can be independently focused in 
examples like (iii). See Sauerland (2008) for discussion of such cases. 
(iii) Zelda praised herself, and LUCIE praised HERself.     
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(43) Only ZELDA painted her own room.      
‘Zelda painted Zelda’s room and no one else painted their own room.’  
‘#Zelda painted Zelda’s room and no one else painted Zelda’s room.’ 
Ellipsis and the interpretation of the exclusive only are focus-sensitive 
phenomena. Under current assumptions we expect them to be sensitive to the CQ. 
We follow Roberts (2012) and Beaver and Clark (2008) in assuming that only 
associates with the CQ, as in (44) (adapted from Coppock and Beaver 2011). The 
restrictor of only is, thus, determined by the CQ. In case the CQ is not given, as in 
(43), it has to be accommodated on the basis of the Focus Principle. The 
Existential F-Closure of the prejacent of only is as in (45a). Strict identity requires 
accommodation of the CQ ‘Who painted Zelda’s room?’. The Existential Closure 
of this question is as in (45b). Accommodation is not possible, since (45b) does 
not entail (45a). Sloppy identity requires accommodation of the CQ ‘Who painted 
their room?’. Accommodation in this case is possible, since (45c) does entail 
(45a). A similar account can be given of the ellipsis example in (43) if we assume 
that ellipsis is also sensitive to the CQ, i.e. that both the elided and the antecedent 
clause are answers to the same CQ.  
(44)  [[ only ]] = λp. MIN(p). MAX(p)      
a. MIN(p) = ∃q ∈ CQ [true(q) ∧ q ≥ p] 
b. MAX(p) = ∀q ∈ CQ [true(q) → p ≥ q] 
(45) a. ExFClo(ZeldaF painted her own room) = ∃x. x painted x’s room 
b. ExClo(Who painted Zelda’s room) = ∃x. x painted Zelda’s room 
c. ExClo(Who painted their room) = ∃x. x painted x’s room 
3.4 Restrictions on the distribution of ownR   
The account in the previous sections sides with previous literature on her own, 
which claims that it is in some sense comparable to reflexive anaphors. We have 
argued that the semantic contribution of own is that of an arity reducer and that 
obligatory binding of the possessive pronoun is the result of those semantics–
albeit in an indirect way. The identification of own as a reflexivizer has been 
debatable because of a complicated empirical picture. Whereas in some cases her 
own appears to exhibit the basic effects usually associated with reflexive anaphors 
(‘Principle A effects’) like obligatory reflexivization, the restriction to c-
commanding antecedents, and various locality restrictions, in other cases it 
appears to violate them. As has been noted before (e.g., Baker 1995; Zribi-Hertz 
1995), discourse anaphoric readings are possible at least in some cases, as in (46). 
Zribi-Hertz (1995) notices that although examples with non-c-commanding 
antecedents are judged deviant out of context, as in (47a) (Zribi-Hertz 1995: ex. 
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5b), they are fine if more context is given, as in (47b) (Zribi-Hertz 1995: ex. 77). 
In the same work it is argued that under the right circumstances, her own can also 
be associated with a non-local antecedent, as in (48) (Zribi-Hertz 1995: ex. 67).  
(46) All errors are my own. 
(47) a.*John1’s sister2 hates his1 own dog.    
b.  My friend John1 already knew that Mary2 disliked animals, but he has  
     been taking tranquillizers since he heard the awful news: John1’s sister2  
     hates his1 own dog as well.         
(48) The developers1 were encouraging people2 to buy their1/2 own houses.  
The diagnostic of Subject Alternatives allows us to target directly reflexivizer 
own. It turns out that Subject Alternatives can only be generated in a subset of 
environments in which own is licensed. Example (49) shows that SA cannot arise 
with a non-c-commanding antecedent. Examples (50) and (51) show that, whereas 
SA arises with a local antecedent, it does not arise with a non-local antecedent. 
Examples (52) and (53) show that SA cannot arise when ownR finds itself within 
islands of movement like the complex-NP-island or a coordination.  
(49) Q: Whose brother/ Who painted Zelda1’s room? 
A:#Zelda’s brother painted her OWN room.             
(50) Q: Who asked Oscar to paint Zelda’s room? 
A:#She asked him to paint her OWN room.        
(51) Q: Who did Oscar ask to paint Zelda’s room? 
A:
 
 He asked her to paint her OWN room.          
(52) Zelda did not paint the door of her OWN room. 
 
#OSCAR painted the door of her room.     
(53) Zelda did not paint her OWN room and her OWN kitchen. 
 
#OSCAR painted her room and her kitchen.    
The restrictions can be explained based on the current account as follows. The 
restriction to c-commanding antecedent follows directly from the derivation in 
(41); after movement of ownR to VoiceP1, which reflexivizes the relevant 
predicate, the subject DP is merged and saturates the unique open argument slot. 
This amounts to saying that ownR is ‘subject-oriented’. The restriction on local 
antecedents follows from the general observation that, like other type-driven 
movements (e.g., Quantifier Raising), movement of ownR targets the first 
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available position that leads to an interpretable outcome.
9
 Lastly, since movement 
of ownR is obligatory, it is predicted to show sensitivity to islands. 
Restrictions on movement might also help explain a further restriction on the 
distribution of ownR. Whereas SA arises with a number of focus-associating 
operators, it does not arise with the operators that Beaver and Clark (2008) 
categorize as Conventionally Associating Operators (CAOs), like only and too in 
(54) and (55) respectively.10  
(54) Zelda only painted her OWN room. #No one else painted her room. 
(55) At 8, Oscar painted Zelda’s room. #At 9, she painted her OWN room too. 
Beaver and Clark (2008) claim that association with focus in the case of CAOs is 
subject to stricter syntactic conditions than association with focus in the case of 
other focus operators. One possible way to account for this generalization is to 
assume that only CAOs are subject to a movement theory of association with 
focus (Tancredi 1990; among others). According to movement theories of 
association, the restrictor of only is determined by covert movement of the focus 
constituent to the complement position of the operator. If so, ownR in (54) and 
(55) needs to move twice: once to VoiceP1 and, subsequently, to the complement 
position of only/too. We tentatively assume that after the first movement ownR 
‘freezes’ so that subsequent movements are not possible.
11
 It remains to be seen 
whether such a restriction on a two-step movement of ownR can be independently 
motivated.    
 We take the distribution of SA to constitute strong evidence against unified 
accounts of own and in favor of an ambiguity account. In a syntactic configuration 
that licenses it, ownR is strongly preferred as in (42) and (43). In other cases, it is 
                                                 
9
 Consider a derivation of (47) in which Zelda QRs out of the DP, as in (iv). Movement does 
create a target node of the right type for ownR, namely TP3, albeit one that requires ‘tucking-in’ of 
ownR between Zelda and the binder prefix. We assume that such a derivation is also ruled out by 
the locality of type-driven movement, since the target node is higher than VoiceP1..    
(iv) [TP5 Zelda [TP4 ownR [TP3 2 [TP2 [DP t2’s brother] [TP1 T [VoiceP2 t1 [VoiceP1 Voice [VP painted [DP  
her1 [D’ [D ‘s t1] room]]]]]]]]]] 
10
 Roger Schwarzschild (p.c.) first suggested to me that the restriction with regard to CAOs might 
be due to the syntax of association with focus. 
11
 As is well known, association with focus is not sensitive to islands, as in (v). Wagner (2006), 
following previous literature, argues that in such cases movement applies to a bigger constituent 
that contains the focus, so that (v) constitutes no counter-evidence to a movement theory of 
association. Notice that no such ‘pied-piping’ derivation is possible for the examples with ownR, 
since ownR must first vacate the DP independently for interpretative reasons. 
(v)  I don’t know anyone who grows bananas, I only know a guy who SMOKES them.  
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interpreted as ownPoss, the second instance of own. The next section makes a 
specific proposal about the contribution of ownPoss.    
4 own and strong possession  
This section makes a specific proposal about the meaning of ownPoss. We intend 
this meaning to capture all instances of own other than ownR, both with and 
without possessive pronouns, although we do not have the space to discuss all 
environments in which ownPoss appears. 
 Perhaps the most prominent intuition about the contribution of own in the 
literature is that it excludes alternative possessors. Thus, authors that pursue a 
unified analysis of own and do not classify it as an anaphor describe it as 
‘emphatic’/‘intensive’ (e.g., Baker 1995) or claim that it marks a focused 
possessor (e.g., Nishiguchi 2009). Importantly, Possessor Alternatives are even 
licensed in environments in which Subject Alternatives are excluded, as in (56), 
so that they cannot always be attributed to ownR.
12
  
(56) a. Zelda1’s brother painted her1 OWN room (not HELEN’s room). 
b. Zelda1 painted the door of her1 OWN room (not HELEN’s room).  
c. Zelda1 only painted her1 OWN room. She didn’t paint HELEN’s room. 
However, the availability of alternative possessors is not a necessary condition to 
license ownPoss. Consider for example Zribi-Hertz’s (1995) example repeated in 
(57).  
(57) My friend John1 already knew that Mary2 disliked animals, but he has been  
taking tranquillizers since he heard the awful news: John1’s sister2 hates his1 
own dog as well. 
The context in (57) does not make available alternative possessors, but rather 
alternative animals with which John could have been in some fleeting relation 
with. Charnavel (2012), who pursues a unified account of the French propre 
‘own’, describes its meaning as paraphrasable with adjectives like personal, 
individual, specific, characteristic, intrinsic.
13
   
We propose to capture this intuition with the entry in (58). According to (58), 
the result of modifying the possessive determiner with ownPoss is to restrict the 
                                                 
12
 This is another reason why the most reliable diagnostic for ownR is Subject rather than Possessor 
Alternatives. 
13
 In fact, Charnavel (2012) claims that French propre is an adjective. As we have seen in section 
2, it cannot be so in the case of own.  
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type of possession relation; it turns it into a strong relation R that is true across 
worlds.
14
  
(58) [[ ’s own ]] = λPλyλeλwιx. P(x)(w) & R(x)(y)(e)(w) & ∀e’∀w’. R(x)(y)(e’) 
(w’) =1 
(59) a. Mary came with her own car. 
b. Mary came with her car. 
The meaning of a DP like her own car in (59a), then, is as in (60).
15
 As 
Nishiguchi (2009) points out (59a) is false if Mary came with a car she borrowed, 
i.e. a car that is not permanently/ intrinsically hers, whereas (59b) can be true in 
the same scenario.16 
(60) [[ her own car]] = ιx.car(x)(w)&R(x)(mary)(e)(w)& ∀e’∀w’. R(x)(mary)(e’) 
(w’) =1 
Notice that narrow focus on ownPoss signals alternatives to possessive determiners 
that introduce different relations R that are not strong. In e.g., (59a), the DP 
contrasts with DPs introducing other cars that Zelda is not in a strong/intrinsic 
relation to. These include rooms with possessors other than Zelda. The entry in 
(58), then, can capture Possessor Alternatives. For more environments which 
license ownPoss and a unified account, we refer to Charnavel’s (2012) treatment of 
French propre, which seems to have the same distribution as ownPoss.  
5 Agentive own 
Previous literature has identified a reading of own that comes very close to the 
effect derived by the emergence of Subject Alternatives. Consider the examples in 
(61).  
(61) a. John makes his own clothes.  
b. Bob Dylan writes his own songs. 
Example (61a) (Safir 1996: ex. 42a) carries the inference that no agent other than 
John is involved in the making of John’s clothes, i.e. that John does not buy 
ready-made clothes. Similarly, in (61b), the sentence states that Bob Dylan writes 
his songs himself, and doesn’t have other people write songs for him. Safir (1996) 
calls own in such examples “agentive own”. The natural question that arises is 
                                                 
14
 The idea expressed by the entry in (58) is reminiscent of a recent proposal in von Prince (2012) 
according to which the semantic correlate of inalieanability is temporal reference. 
15
 Most probably the restriction must be treated as a presupposition. I disregard this complication 
here. 
16
 Crucially, ownPoss does not determine the content of the relation R in any way; R can be resolved 
to possession, as in (59a), but also to any other contextually prominent relation. 
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whether agentive own and SA are one phenomenon, and, if so, whether ownR can 
be reduced to whatever mechanism derives agentive own. We argue in this section 
that this cannot be the case.   
In fact, there is an intuitive way to understand the inferences in (61) based on 
ownPoss. Suppose own in (61a) is ownPoss. Then the issue arises of why ownPoss is 
used, i.e. what justifies characterizing the clothes as intrinsically John’s? A 
natural reason is that Oscar is the sole creator of the clothes, i.e. he and no one 
else creates the clothes. Charnavel (2012) expresses an almost identical intuition 
for the ‘agentive reading’ of French propre ‘own’, which is only possible with 
creation verbs and does not give rise to SA in the examples discussed in section 
3.2. There are several reasons to reject a unification of SA and agentive own. First 
of all, SA, as described in section 3.2, shows no restriction to creation verbs, 
unlike agentive own. Second, agentive own requires no focus on own, unlike SA. 
Lastly, in the case of agentive own in (61) the possessive DPs are necessarily 
interpreted non-referentially. This is not the case with SA in section 3, where the 
possessive DPs refer to specific individuals. 
As noted above, several authors have claimed that own is an intensifier. Safir 
(1996) explicitly makes the claim that agentive own can be paraphrased with the 
adverbial intensifier herself, as in (62).  
(62) a. John makes his clothes himself.  
b. Bob Dylan writes his songs himself. 
Spathas, Alexiadou and Schäfer (to appear) propose the semantics of anti-
assistive intensifiers in (63) and discuss how ‘SA readings’ arise on the basis of 
such semantics.  
(63) [[ own/ himselfaa ]] = λPe,stλyλe. f(y)(e) & ∀e’∀x. (e’≤e & agent(x)(e’)) → 
x=y 
Assuming that own in (62a) is an anti-assistive intensifier ownaa with the meaning 
in (63), (62a) and (62b) assert that there is no agent other than John in all sub-
events of events of making John’s clothes. Although ownaa could in principle 
explain the restrictions on SA noted in section 3.3 since the meaning in (63) 
would force ownaa to move and attach to a projection of Voice, like ownR, it is not 
possible to reduce SA to ownaa. Anti-assistive intensifiers show aspectual/ 
Aktionsart restrictions; they are only possible with activities and 
accomplishments, but not with achievements, as shown in (64). SA, however, can 
also arise with achievements, as in (65).  
(64) ??John noticed his painting himselfaa. 
(65) Q: Who noticed John’s painting? 
A: He noticed his OWN painting.  
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In addition, Howell (2010) points out that anti-assistive intensifiers license 
modification by degree expressions that measure the level of involvement of the 
external argument, as in (66). No such reading is licensed in the case of own, 
however, as shown in (67).
17
  
(66) John built the house almost/ partly/ half/ completely himselfaa. 
‘John built the house almost/ partly/ half/ completely without help.’ 
(67) John almost/ partly/ half/ completely built his OWN house. 
‘#John built the house almost/ partly/ half/ completely without help.’ 
6 Conclusions 
This paper examined the status of a non-local reflexivization strategy based on the 
possessive marker own modifying a possessive pronoun. Using an independently 
established diagnostic based on focus alternatives, it has been argued that own is, 
in such cases, an arity reducer operating on a predicate and identifying two of its 
arguments. The predicate is a non-lexical predicate derived by syntactic means. In 
the proposed analysis, obligatory binding is the result of the lexical semantics of 
own, and locality restrictions are the result of the syntactic mechanism deriving 
the predicate, here movement. We thus derive the effects usually associated with 
‘Principle A’ without the need to assume any such principle as a primitive of the 
theory. Importantly, the distribution of reflexivizer own forces us to adopt an 
ambiguity account of the possessive marker. In its second instance, own is a 
marker of strong/inalienable possession.    
References 
Ahn, Byron. 2012. Twin reflexives. Invited talk, January 20, 2012. University of 
Arizona Linguistics Colloquium. 
Abney, Steven Paul. 1987. The English noun phrase in its sentential aspect. Ph.D. 
Dissertation, MIT. 
Bach, Emmon and Barbara Partee. 1980. Anaphora and semantic structure. In 
Jody Kreiman and Almerindo E. Ojeda (eds.), The Parasession on Pronouns 
and Anaphora, 1-28. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
                                                 
17
 As Bert LeBruyn (p.c.) points out, similar inferences are generated every time the possessive DP 
contains a noun that favors the relation R to be resolved to the agentive quale (Pustejovsky 1995, 
Vikner and Jensen 2002). In, e.g., (vi), there is an inference that I am the sole writer of the book.  
(vi) My own book is more popular than McCarthy’s.  
Disentangling own 
288 
 
Baker, Carl. 1995. Contrast, discourse prominence, and intensification, with 
special reference to locally-free reflexives in British English. Language 
71(1), 63-101. 
Barker, Chris. 1995. Possessive Descriptions. CSLI Publications. 
Beaver, David and Brady Clark. 2008. Sense and Sensitivity. Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
Büring, Daniel. 2005. Binding Theory. Cambridge University Press. 
Charnavel, Isabelle. 2012. On her own: parsimonious compositionality. Ph.D. 
Dissertation, UCLA. 
Coppock, Elizabeth and David Beaver. 2011. Sole sisters. 
In Neil Ashton, Anca Chereches, and David Lutz (eds.), Semantics and 
Linguistic Theory (SALT) 21, 197-217. Ithaca, NY: CLC. 
Fiengo, Robert and James Higginbotham. 1981. Opacity in NP. Linguistic 
Analysis 7, 395-421.  
Heim, Irene and Angelika Kratzer. 1998. Semantics in Generative Grammar. 
Blackwell. 
Howell, Jonathan. 2012. Meaning and prosody. Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell 
University. 
Jackendoff, Ray. 1972. Semantic Interpretation in Generative Grammar. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Kratzer, Angelika. 1996. Severing the external argument from its verb. In Johan 
Rooryck and Laurie Zaring (eds.), Phrase Structure and the Lexicon, 109-
137. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Lechner, Winfried. 2012. Towards a theory of transparent reflexivization. Ms. 
University of Athens. 
Nishiguchi, Sumiyo. 2009. Own. 80th Meeting of English Literary Society of 
Japan, 116-118. 
Nissenbaum, Jon. 2000. Covert movement and parasitic gaps. In Hirotani, A. 
Coetzee, N. Hall, and J.-Y. Kim (eds.), North-Eastern Linguistic Society 
(NELS) 30, 541-555. Amherst, MA: GLSA Publications. 
Pollard, Carl and Ivan A. Sag. 1994. Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press and Stanford: CSLI Publications.  
von Prince, Kilu. 2012. Nominal possession in Daakaka. Austronesian Formal 
Linguistics Association (AFLA) 18, 156-170. 
Pustejovsky, James. 1995. The Generative Lexicon. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Reinhart, Tanya and Eric Reuland. 1993. Reflexivity. Linguistic Inquiry 24, 657–
720. 
Roberts, Craige 2012. Information structure in discourse: towards an integrated 
formal theory of pragmatics. Semantics and Pragmatics 5, 1-69. Reprint of 
Roberts 1996. 
Spathas 
289 
 
Safir, Ken. 1996. Semantic atoms of anaphora. Natural Language and Linguistic 
Theory 14(3), 545-589. 
Sauerland, Uli. 2008. The silent content of bound variable pronouns. In Kyle  
Johnson (ed.), Topics in Ellipsis, 183-209. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Schwarzschild, Roger. 1999. GIVENness, AvoidF and other constraints on the 
placement of accent. Natural Language Semantics 7, 141-77.  
Spathas, Giorgos. 2010. Focus on anaphora. PhD Dissertation. University of 
Utrecht, LOT dissertation series. 
Spathas, Giorgos 2012. Reflexivizers and intensifiers: consequences for a theory 
of focus. In Emmanuel Chemla, Vincent Homer, and Grégoire Winterstein 
(eds.), Sinn und Bedeutung 17, 581-598. 
Spathas, Giorgos, Artemis Alexiadou and Florian Schäfer. Middle Voice and 
reflexive interpretations: afto-prefixation in Greek. To appear in Natural 
Language and Linguistic Theory. 
Szabolcsi, Anna. 1992. Combinatory grammar and projection from the lexicon. In 
Anna Szabolcsi and Ivan Sag (eds.), Lexical Matters, 241-269. Stanford: 
CSLI. 
Truckenbrodt,  Hubert. 1995.  Phonological  phrases:  their  relation  to  syntax,  
focus,  and prominence. Ph.D. Dissertation, MIT. 
Vikner, Carl and Per Anker Jensen. 2002. A semantic analysis of the English 
genitive: Interaction of lexical and formal semantics. Studia Linguistica 56, 
191-226.  
Wagner, Michael. 2006. Association by movement. Evidence from NPI-licensing. 
Natural Language Semantics 14, 297–324. 
Zribi-Hertz, Anne. 1995. Emphatic or reflexive? On the endophoric character of 
French lui-même and similar complex pronouns. Journal of Linguistics 31(2), 
333-374. 
 
 
Giorgos Spathas 
Institut für Linguistik: Anglistik 
Keplerstr. 17 
Stuttgart, 70174 
Germany 
g.spathas@gmail.com / giorgos.spathas@ifla.uni-stuttgart.de 
